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NOTES 
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: THE FRONT LINE OF A 
NEW WORLD ECONOMIC WAR1 
The means by which enlightened rulers and sagacious generals 
moved and conquered others, that their achievements surpassed the 
masses, was advance knowledge. Advance knowledge cannot be gained 
from ghosts and spirits, inferred from phenomena, or projected from the 
measures of Heaven, but must be gained from men for it is the knowl-
edge of the enemy's true situation.2 
The spy of the future is less likely to resemble James Bond, whose 
chief assets were his fists, than the Line X engineer who lives quietly 
down the street and never does anything more violent than turn a page 
of a manual or flick on his microcomputer. 3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
With the end of the Cold War, although warfare per se has not 
declined, the threat of nuclear war is steadily declining. At the same 
time, this has led to an increase in the importance of economic competi-
tiveness in nations' definitions of national security. Prior to the end of 
the Cold War, many international relationships were defined according 
to military alliances. These relationships are changing significantly due 
to a shifting international focus from a military to an economic outlook, 
and allies now see one another as competitors in the global economy. 
Under this new arrangement, industrialized countries striving to 
maintain their standards of living, and developing nations eager to im-
prove such standards, face enormous pressure to succeed. They will 
pursue any and all means which bear the potential to ensure their pro-
ductivity and economic security. When economic objectives begin to 
play a more dominant role in defining national security, the interest in 
1. Journalist and business consultant Sam Perry suggests that "[ e ]conomic espionage is the 
front line of a new world economic war. It is a war that most companies from open, democratic 
nations are illprepared to fight." See Sam Perry, Economic Espionage and Corporate 
Responsibility, CJ lNT'L, Mar.-Apr., 1995 <http://www.acsp.uic.edu/oicj/pubs/cji/110203.html>. 
2. SuN Tzu, ART OF WAR, reprinted in THE COMPLETE ART OF WAR, at 118 (Ralph D. 
Sawyer, trans., Westview Press 1996). 
3. ALVIN ToFFLER, POWER SHIFT: KNOWLEDGE, WEALTH, AND VIOLENCE AT THE EDGE OF 
THE 2}5T CENTURY 311 (1990). 
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economic espionage expands. The end result for today's society is that 
economic espionage is the front line of a new world economic war. 
This note will examine the problems surrounding economic espio-
nage at the international level. A brief history of the problem will be 
presented first. Section two will then describe the current problem of 
economic espionage. Section three will consider the specific effects of 
economic espionage has on individual countries-from the victims to 
the perpetrators to the innocent bystanders in the global economic espio-
nage struggle. Section four will discuss relative international agree-
ments, laws, and organizations, as well as the reasons for their 
ineffectiveness in curbing international economic espionage. Finally, 
section five will put forth and analyze possible solutions to the problem. 
B. Defining Economic Espionage 
Many of the world's intelligence units have attempted to define 
economic espionage. Simply put, economic espionage is the "outright 
theft of private information."4 A different and somewhat more defini-
tive description comes from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
("CSIS"). According to CSIS, economic espionage is "illegal, clandes-
tine, coercive or deceptive activity engaged in or facilitated by a foreign 
government designed to gain unauthorized access to economic intelli-
gence, such as proprietary information or technology, for economic ad-
vantage. "5 Still another, and far more complex definition is contained in 
the United States' Economic Espionage Act,6 one of the few forms of 
legislation enacted by any state to help suppress economic espionage. 
The Economic Espionage Act criminalizes7 activity by anyone who: 
intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign gov-
ernment, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly-( 1) 
steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or con-
ceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret; (2) with-
out authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, 
downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, 
delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret; (3) re-
ceives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been 
stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; ( 4) 
4. Peter Schweizer, The Growth of Economic Espionage: America is Target Number One, 
FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 9. 
5. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Economic Security (1996) <http://www.csis-
scrs.gc.ca/eng/backgmd/back6e.html>. 
6. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1997). 
7. Economic Espionage Act § 1831. Penalties for those convicted of this activity include 
fines up to $500,000, or imprisonment for up to fifteen years, or both. 
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attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs ( 1) 
through (3); or (5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit 
any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or 
more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy. . .. 8 
American legislators have determined that the above activity con-
stitutes economic espionage. 
An important concept related to economic espionage is economic 
intelligence. CSIS explains that economic intelligence is "policy or 
commercially relevant economic information, including technological 
data, financial, proprietary commercial and government information, the 
acquisition of which by foreign interests could, either directly or indi-
rectly, assist the relative productivity or competitive position of the 
economy of the collecting organization's country."9 Those who conduct 
economic espionage specifically target this class of information. 10 
C. A Brief History of Economic Espionage 
Espionage in the traditional sense is the way in which spies acquire 
an enemy's military secrets. A few famous incidents of espionage in-
clude England's use of spies to acquire military information in defeating 
the Spanish Armada in 1588; the Allies' use of spies during World War 
II in def eating the Axis powers; and the former Soviet Union's use of 
spies in stealing atomic bomb secrets from the United States and Great 
Britain. 11 Traditional espionage has transformed with the passing of the 
Cold War and the rise of international economic competition. Nations' 
economic and national security are closely connected and espionage ac-
tivities are changing from military to economic foci. 12 
Although the end of the Cold War seemingly brings a surge of eco-
nomic espionage activity, stealing the ideas of a business competitor is 
not a new game in the world market. Indeed, economic espionage is a 
practice that has existed for thousands of years. An early instance of 
economic espionage occurred over 1500 years ago and involved these-
cret of silk. A Chinese princess traveled abroad, wearing a flowered hat. 
She hid silkworms in the flowers and gave them to a man in India. 
8. Id. 
9. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, supra note 5. 
10. Id. 
11. Edwin Fraumann, Economic Espionage: Security Missions Redefined, 57 Pus. AoMIN. 
REv. 303 (1997). 
12. Id. 
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Thus, through economic espionage, the secret of silk escaped from 
China. 13 
In the eighteenth century, China again lost a secret because of eco-
nomic espionage. After China had spent centuries of making high-qual-
ity porcelain through a process known only to its alchemists, the French 
Jesuit, Father d'Entrecolles, visited the royal porcelain factory in China, 
where he learned the secrets of porcelain production and described the 
process in writings he sent to France. 14 
The early twentieth century and the reality of world-wide conflict 
led to significant incidents of economic espionage, proving that eco-
nomic and military intelligence were equally important. 15 Opposing 
sides in World War I searched for secret weapons, knowing that such 
weapons would be available in a foreign country's industrial sector. 16 
Spies gained information on how to create weapons like poison gas. 17 
As was already known, spying saved countries time and financial re-
sources that they would have spent developing poison gas on their own. 
The spies stole the secret from the Germans, and shortly afterward many 
countries used poison gas against each other during warfare. 18 
In the present day, economic espionage continually thrives. A few 
publicized incidents in more recent history include the following. In 
Japan, the ministry for international trade and industry identifies foreign 
high-tech companies that are likely to produce significant products in the 
near future. 19 The ministry supplies crucial information to Japanese 
companies, leading them toward purchasing the foreign companies 
through front organizations, false flag operations, or by overt means. 20 
In an unrelated incident, a firm in the United States lost a contract bid 
for international electronics. Shortly thereafter, it learned that a Euro-
pean intelligence agency somehow intercepted its pricing information. 
The European agency turned this critical data over to another company 
which eventually won the contract bid.21 In still another incident, CSIS 
discovered that a handful of "flight attendants" on Air France were ac-
13. JACQUES BERGIER, SECRET ARMIES: THE GROWTH OF CORPORATE AND INDUSTRIAL ESPI-
ONAGE 3 (Harol J. Salemson trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1975) (1969). 
14. Id. at 4. 
15. Id. at 31. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 32. 
19. Thomas J. Jackamo, III, From the Cold War to the New Multilateral World Order: The 
Evolution of Covert Operations and the Customary International Law of Non-Intervention, 32 VA. 
J. lNT'L L. 929, 945 (1992). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
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tually agents of the French intelligence service, strategically positioned 
to spy on companies' executives and gather their trade secrets.22 These 
present-day examples, together with the afore-mentioned historical evi-
dence, illustrate a crucial point: that economic espionage has been and 
continues to be on the rise. 
IL CURRENT TRENDS IN ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
A. Participants in the Trade 
Countries involved. Counterintelligence agent George Lepine' s de-
scription of global involvement in economic espionage is startling: "The 
question these days," he says, "isn't which country commits economic 
espionage, but which doesn't."23 He and others estimate that two dozen 
countries regularly participate in economic espionage activities.24 
Among these are industrialized countries, including Japan, France, Rus-
sia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, and various Middle Eastern and 
Latin American countries.25 According to a Canadian survey, the worst 
offenders are Asian governments, with western European governments 
following closely.26 Other offenders can be found in various businesses 
throughout the United States, as indicated in a 1997 survey by The Fu-
tures Group. The survey revealed that in the United States, "[a] full 82 
percent of companies with annual revenues of more than $10 billion 
now have an organized intelligence unit."27 But economic espionage is 
not carried out exclusively by first world powers. "Countries that here-
tofore have not been considered intelligence threats account for much of 
the economic collection currently being investigated by. . .law enforce-
ment communities."28 In general, any nation that competes in the world 
market and has enough motivation to spy will engage in economic 
espionage. 29 
The significance surrounding the classes of parties involved in eco-
nomic espionage is twofold. First, friendly and allied nations commit 
22. Anthony Boadle, Canada Spy-Catcher Says High-Tech Firms Targeted, THE REUTER 
EUROPEAN Bus. REPORT, Apr. 13, 1994. 
23. Ian McGugan, The Spy Who Came in for the Gold, CAN. Bus., May 1, 1995, at 99. 
24. Id. 
25. Jackamo, supra note 19, at 944; Schweizer, supra note 4. 
26. McGugan, supra note 23. 
27. Katherine Hobson, Corporate Intelligence Seen as a Necessity (visited Sept. 30, 1998) 
<http://www.abcnews.com/sections/business/DailyNews/spy980924/index.html>. The Futures 
Group is a competitive intelligence consultant in the United States. 
28. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage 
(July 1995) <http://www.nsi.org/Library /Espionage/indust.html>. 
29. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, supra note 5. 
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espionage against one another. In the world of economic espionage, 
there are no true friendly relations, largely due to the fact that countries 
which engage in the activity are vying for a rung on the global market 
ladder. 30 As former French intelligence chief Pierre Marion points out, 
"[i]t is an elementary blunder to think we're allies ... When it comes to 
business, it's war."31 Second, developing nations are heavily involved 
in the trade, due to recent political developments, especially the decline 
of communism. 32 Formerly communist states must quickly catch up 
with the West, and economic espionage often provides an avenue to do 
just that. Without communism, intelligence agents from Eastern block 
countries are unemployed and available in the open market. 33 The in-
volvement of Eastern block agents is threatening because their intelli-
gence activities are not restricted by traditional notions of international 
business ethics. 34 Therefore, such agents may go to any lengths to ac-
quire the information they seek. 
Individuals involved. There is no specific person who qualifies as 
an intelligence gatherer. However, some of the more common interna-
tional snoops include competitors, vendors, investigators, business intel-
ligence consultants, the press, labor negotiators, and government 
agencies.35 Some countries hire individuals, rather than large organiza-
tions or intelligence agencies, to do their spying for them.36 Other coun-
tries hire teams of individuals to enter foreign companies and steal 
ideas.37 
B. Targets 
Realistically, no business is especially immune from economic es-
pionage. Targets include two main forms: industry and proprietary busi-
ness information. 38 Government and corporate financial and trade data 
are also stolen on a regular basis. Industries are probably the biggest 
targets of economic espionage. Among those regularly sought are bio-
30. Marc A. Moyer, Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: A 
Formidable Weapon in the War Against Economic Espionage, 15 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 178, 
182 (1994); Jackamo, supra note 19, at 944. 
31. Stanley Kober, Why Spy? The Uses and Misuses of Intelligence, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 
1998, at 10. 
32. Moyer, supra note 30, at 183. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Kevin D. Murray, Ten Spy-Busting Secrets (visited Sept. 10, 1998) <http:// 
www .tscm.com/murray .html>. 
36. JoHN J. FIALKA, WAR BY 0rHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 18 ( 1997). 
37. Id. at 29 
38. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 
supra note 28. 
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technology; aerospace; telecommunications, including information su-
perhighway technology; computer software and hardware; advanced 
transportation and engine technology; oil and gas companies; advanced 
materials and coatings, including "stealth" technologies; energy re-
search; defense and armaments technology; manufacturing processes; 
semiconductors; and critical technologies: manufacturing processes and 
technologies, aeronautics and surface transportation systems, and energy 
and environmental related technologies. 39 
The second targeted category is proprietary business information. 
Proprietary business information includes bid, contract, customer, and 
strategy information. What seems mundane and unimportant to compa-
nies can be very important to competitors-numerous amounts of stolen 
information consists of plant layouts, client lists and bids.40 
C. Reasons Why Countries Conduct Economic Espionage 
To Accelerate Modernization. The desire of states to possess the 
most modern industries and technologies possible is not an unreasonable 
one. Modernized states realize better overall economic development, 
self-sufficiency, and political autonomy than do undeveloped states.41 
In order to become more modernized, states with lesser-developed econ-
omies are tempted to import foreign technologies by whatever means are 
available, including economic espionage. Economic espionage appeals 
to these states because it saves them the time and financial resources 
they would have spent to develop the technologies on their own.42 
Success Given in Economic Espionage. Nations also commit eco-
nomic espionage because it is an area in which many of them are capa-
ble of success. Many countries already have the ability to carry out 
economic espionage because they the have sufficient funds and appara-
tus to do so. (Appendix) A United States Congressional intelligence 
committee report in 1994 stated that "reports obtained since 1990 indi-
cate that economic espionage is becoming increasingly central to the 
operations of many of the world's intelligence services and is absorbing 
larger portions of their staffing and budget."43 Additionally, many coun-
tries use their leftover Cold War spying apparatus, such as giant com-
39. Boadle, supra note 22; Moyer, supra note 30, at 184; Annual Report to Congress on 
Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, supra note 28. 
40. Boadle, supra note 22. 
41. ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 112 (1987). 
42. Id. 
43. F1ALKA, supra note 36, at 5 (quoting Report on U.S. Critical Technology Companies, 
Report to Congress on Foreign Acquisition of and Espionage Activities Against U.S. Critical 
Technology Companies, 1994, p. 5). 
7
et al.: Economic Espionage
Published by SURFACE, 1998
134 Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com. [Vol. 26:127 
puter databases, scanners for eavesdropping, spy satellites, and bugs and 
wiretaps, to conduct economic espionage activities.44 
Keeps Agents Employed. Some intelligence agents commit eco-
nomic espionage to fill voids left from the Cold War, especially those 
agents from Eastern block countries, where the need for secret services 
has lessened.45 These agents need new reasons to continue their spy 
work, and the economic sector occupies their time where the military 
sector previously did so.46 
Leads to More Effective Global Competition. Companies commit 
economic espionage to increase their chances for success in the world 
market. 47 Economic espionage helps nations to maintain economic and 
technological competitiveness48 and to gain an edge on a competitor be-
cause it helps to provide technologically limited countries with the mod-
em devices they need. 49 
Profitable Business. Peter Schweizer writes, "[t]hat so many states 
practice economic espionage is a testament to how profitable it is be-
lieved to be."50 Some countries gain financial profit as well as technol-
ogy from economic espionage. In Australia, for example, economic 
espionage is estimated to be worth $2 billion per year. 51 France ac-
quired a $2 billion deal with India for airplanes because of the economic 
espionage activities of the Direction Generale de la Securite 
Exterieure. 52 
Quick and Cheap. Getting the means of production is often more 
important for some countries than acquiring the actual technology. 53 
The manufacture of a particular product, ballbearings for example, may 
not be a secret, but the means by which it is done well takes years to 
develop.54 Countries that steal this information are therefore able to cut 
down the amount of time it would take to develop effective manufactur-
44. FIALKA, supra note 36, at 5. 
45. McGugan, supra note 23. 
46. Jackamo, supra note 19, at 938. 
47. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 
supra note 28. 
48. Jackamo, supra note 19, at 943. 
49. The Trade in Secrets, THE BULLETIN, June 28, 1994 <http://www.dap.csiro.au/lnterest/ 
Secrets/secrets.html>. 
50. Schweizer, supra note 4. 
51 . The Trade in Secrets, supra note 49. 
52. Schweizer, supra note 4. The Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure is the intelli-
gence service of France. 
53. Moyer, supra note 30, at 187. 
54. Id. 
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ing processes on their own. 55 In sum, the supported philosophy is that it 
is quick and cheap to steal-crime pays. 
Promotes National Security. "It has now been proven that eco-
nomic strength of a nation is going to determine more than military 
power."56 A nation's economic status makes up a large part of its na-
tional security. 57 This economic status is dependent upon a nation's 
ability to compete effectively in the world market. Because of this, eco-
nomic competition "must be more carefully balanced with traditional 
military and intelligence concerns in determining policy to protect na-
tional security."58 
D. Popular Methods 
Virtually every traditional espionage method used during war is 
employed in today's business world. There are numerous ways in which 
countries carry out economic espionage, and many of these methods re-
quire little effort on the part of the perpetrators. Author Ira Winkler 
explains his approach to espionage: "I 'steal' most of my information by 
simply asking for it, looking on desktops, going up to computers that are 
left on all day, and digging through the trash. With few exceptions, all 
real-life James Bonds get their information exactly the same way."59 
The following are some of the most common methods of conducting 
economic espionage. 
Planting "Moles" or Recruiting Agents. "Moles" are spies that are 
put into seemingly legitimate positions in a competitor's company.60 
Many intelligence gatherers rely on trusted workers within companies or 
organizations to provide them with proprietary and classified informa-
tion. 61 A study by the American Society for Industrial Security 
("ASIS") concluded that "trusted insiders pose the greatest risk" to the 
divulgence of trade secrets.62 Lower-ranking employees, such as secre-
taries, computer operators, or maintenance workers, are regularly re-
cruited because they often have desirable access to information and are 
55. Id. 
56. Steve Barth, Spy vs. Spy, World Trade, Aug. 1, 1998, at 34 (quoting John Schiman, 
special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Los Angeles). 
57. Id. at 188-89. 
58. Id. 
59. Barth, supra note 56. 
60. Id. at 180. 
61. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 
supra note 28. 
62. Barth, supra note 56. 
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easily manipulated by intelligence agencies due to their lower pay and 
status within their respective companies.63 
Surveillance, Clandestine Entry, and Bag Ops. Intelligence gather-
ers often break into their competitors' offices outright and steal the in-
formation they want. Many incident reports describe stolen laptop 
computers, disks, and confidential files. "One common method of steal-
ing laptops at airports is for the thief's accomplice to get into line at the 
x-ray machine just in front of the victim. While the accomplice slowly 
empties his pockets of keys and loose change, the thief takes your 
laptops off the conveyor on the other side of the machine and spirits it 
away."64 Additionally, hotel rooms and safes are regular targets.65 
Some spies bribe hotel operators to provide access to the hotel rooms, 
which is known as a "bag op." During bag ops, gatherers search unat-
tended luggage and confiscate or photograph anything they think may be 
valuable to them. 66 
Technical Operations. Computer hacking and telecommunication 
interceptions are common, especially where systems are not fully pro-
tected against such intrusions.67 Easy targets are cellular and cordless 
telephones.68 Hacking and interceptions can provide much information 
to intelligence gatherers, including trade secrets and other forms of com-
petitive information.69 In one case, "it was suspected that a host govern-
ment was intercepting telephone conversations between an executive 
abroad and his Canadian company headquarters. Canadian executives 
discussed detailed negotiation information including a specific minimum 
bid. This minimum bid was the immediate counter-offer put forward by 
the host company the following day."70 
Student Placements. When students study abroad, some govern-
ments task them with acquiring economic and technical information 
about their host countries.71 Common perpetrators are graduate students 
who serve professors as research assistants free of charge. In research 
63. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 
supra note 28. 
64. Barth, supra note 56. 
65. McGugan, supra note 23. 
66. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 
supra note 28. 
67. Economic Espionage: Information on Threat from U.S. Allies, GAOtr-NSIAD-96-114 
(Feb. 28, 1996) <http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/nsi961l4.html>. 
68. Murray, supra note 35. 
69. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 
supra note 28. 
70. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, supra note 5. 
71. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 
supra note 28. 
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positions, the foreign graduate students gain access to the professor's 
research, learning technological applications which they can then relay 
to their home govemments.72 
Debriefing Travelers. Debriefing citizens after foreign travel is 
popular in some countries. Travelers are asked for any information ac-
quired during their trips abroad. The debriefing sessions are considered 
offensive to some travelers, while others accept them as part of traveling 
abroad.73 
Dumpster Diving. Also known as trash trawling, waste archaeol-
ogy, and trashing, dumpster diving is the act of rummaging through a . 
competitor's garbage to obtain information. Some believe it is the 
number one method of business and personal espionage. 74 
Bugging and Tapping. Business class seats on airlines, offices, ho-
tel rooms, and restaurants are regularly bugged and tapped by spies. In a 
specific incident, a European airline bugged its entire business class sec-
tion, while spies posed as flight attendants.75 
Drop-by Spies. Some intelligence gatherers pose as technicians and 
repair persons in order to get to confidential information. Others volun-
teer for positions that get them close to sensitive information.76 Some 
spies even pose as documentary camera crew members to gain access to 
places where secret information is kept. 77 
E. Harmful Effects 
Costs to the World Economy. As long as countries continue to con-
duct economic espionage activities, there will be serious implications for 
the world economy. Many scholars and reporters attempt to estimate 
economic espionage's financial burdens to society. Such costs are diffi-
cult to determine, due to the fact that international industry is generally 
reluctant to discuss them. No company wants to admit it has suffered 
significant financial loss at the hands of foreign spies, especially when it 
depends on shareholder support that may discontinue if shareholders feel 
the company is faltering.78 IBM, however, came forward and discussed 
its losses. In 1992, IBM vice-president Marshall Phelps told a United 
States Congressional committee that his company suffered billions of 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Murray, supra note 35. 
75. Boadle, supra note 22. 
76. Economic Espionage: Information on Threat from U.S. Allies, supra note 67. 
77. Id. 
78. Boadle, supra note 22. 
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dollars in losses due to theft of proprietary information. 79 This calcula-
tion supports the estimates of economists who claim that individual 
companies and firms lose billions of dollars annually through economic 
espionage. 8° For example, in its Intellectual Property Loss Survey Re-
port from May 1998, ASIS estimated that American businesses may lose 
over $250 billion annually because of economic espionage.81 
In spite of the difficulties of determining exact costs of economic 
espionage, two notions are clear: intelligence agencies spend billions of 
dollars each year in their espionage efforts, and counterintelligence 
agencies spend billions of dollars each year trying to thwart those 
efforts.82 
In addition to direct financial loss, companies face other damages 
resulting from economic espionage: job loss and diminished or even lost 
contracts. 83 
Costs to Society in General. In an age where power stems from 
wealth, there is an ever-increasing fear that acquisition of economic in-
formation will lead to the breakdown of international security with eco-
nomic foes of today becoming military foes of tomorrow. Society 
therefore lives in fear of economic espionage. 
Economic espionage can destroy the incentive to innovate. No one 
wants to create new ideas if there is a strong likelihood that the ideas 
will be stolen, used, and sold by competitors. Not only will competitors 
take credit for ideas which belong to the original creators, but they will 
also profit from them financially, while the original creator will be left 
with nothing. This greatly discourages creativity. 
F. Preventive Measures 
One scholar points out that economic espionage "is an alive and 
growing art, and it's spawning a lot of protective measures."84 Many 
countries respond to the threat of economic espionage in their own ways, 
by creating preventive measures, awareness and protection programs, 
and enacting laws. The following are recent examples of such action. 
Canada. In January 1992, CSIS created its national Liaison/ 
Awareness Program, which "seeks to develop an ongoing dialogue with 
organizations, both public and private, concerning the threat posed to 
79. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, supra note 5. 
80. Id. 
81 . Barth, supra note 56. 
82. Richard Norton-Taylor, Spooky Business, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 26, 1997. 
83. FIALKA, supra note 36, at 6. 
84. The Trade in Secrets, supra note 49. 
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Canadian interests by foreign government involvement in economic and 
defense-related espionage. "85 The program enables CSIS to collect and 
assess information that will promote its investigation of economic espio-
nage activities against Canada. CSIS assesses the specific threats and 
advises the Canadian government accordingly. 86 
France. Recently, France developed INTELCO, a private intelli-
gence company.87 One of INTELCO's purposes is to teach business 
people how to safeguard their companies against espionage by foreign 
competitors.88 The company is run by J. Pichot-Duclos, a former army 
general who oversaw France's military school for spies until 1992. 89 
Australia. Australia is in the process of changing its ASIO charter 
to allow investigations on the use of economic espionage in Australia. 
(ASIO is Australia's counter espionage agency.) If the charter is 
changed, non-military secrets will be protected in the same way as polit-
ically-motivated violence is protected.90 
United States. In 1996, Congress passed the Economic Espionage 
Act, which proposes to deter theft of trade secrets by individuals and 
teams both within the United States and abroad. The Act purports to 
punish anyone who: 
steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or 
conceals, or by fraud, artifice or deception obtains a trade secret; without 
authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, 
downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, 
delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret; re-
ceives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been 
stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without 
authorization .... 91 
By December 1996, the United States was already prepared to fight 
one of its first cases under the new law, after two brothers, Patrick and 
Daniel Worthing, were arrested for misappropriating diskettes and other 
forms of confidential research information from the company for which 
they both worked.92 Since the onset of this case, five other criminal 
actions have been brought under the Economic Espionage Act, resulting 
85. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, supra note 5. 
86. Id. 
87. FIALKA, supra note 36, at 99. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. The Trade in Secrets, supra note 49. 
91. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a), 1832(a). 
92. R. Mark Halligan, Reported Criminal Arrests Under the Economic Espionage Act of 
1996 (visited Sept. 10, 1998) <http://www.execpc.com/-mhallign/indict.html>. 
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in two convictions.93 Despite the presence of the Economic Espionage 
Act, however, it does not appear that it is being used to its full capacity. 
The few cases that have actually been brought to trial account for only a 
miniscule portion of the large number that are believed to exist.94 
Multistate conferences. In recent years, some of the world's secur-
ity organizations have held world-wide conferences to educate states on 
economic espionage and how to best protect themselves against it. In 
1997, the National Computer Security Association ("NCSA") held such 
a conference in Brussels, Belgium.95 Representatives from over thirty 
states participated in the "War by Other Means" conference that was 
geared toward protection of computer-related information.96 The par-
ticipants discussed and learned about such issues as open source intelli-
gence and information strategy, information security basics, and 
information warfare and cyber-terrorism basics.97 This was the NCSA's 
sixth conference on information warfare gathering, and it is helping to 
increase awareness of the "cyber battlefield" for economic espionage.98 
Other Preventive Measures. Intelligence experts advise companies 
to protect their classified information carefully and effectively. Some of 
their suggestions include the following: 
Appropriate classification, control and protection of sensitive 
documents; 
Protection of computer databases and network links from unauthor-
ized access; 
Proper storage and disposal of sensitive documents; 
Discussion of sensitive company matters in appropriate locations; 
Realistic controls on employees' and visitors' access to sensitive 
facilities and materials; 
Sensitivity and caution with the choice of medium used for busi-
ness communications (i.e. cellular phones, open fax and phone lines); 
93. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, et al., The Economic Espionage Act: A Prosecution Update, 80 J. 
PAT. [&TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y 360 (1998). See United States v. Hsu, 982 F.Supp. 1022 (E.D. 
Pa. 1997), reversed by United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Pin 
Yen Yang, Criminal No. 1:97MG0109 (N.D. Ohio 1997); United States v. Davis (MD Tenn. 
1997); United States v. Trujillo-Cohen (CR-H-97-251, S.D. Tex. 1997); United States v. Camp-
bell (MD Tenn. 1997). 
94. Id. at 368. 
95. Bill Pietrucha, NCSA Plans Information Warfare Conference, IAC (SM) INDUSTRY Ex-
PRESS (SM); NEWSBYTES, Feb. 5, 1997. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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Education and sensitization of all employees about the threat that 
economic espionage may pose to job security and the organization's 
economic well-being; and 
Emphasis on sharing responsibility amongst all employees for ad-
herence to effective security policies and practices.99 
III. EXISTING TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND AN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION RELATED TO ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
A. General Problems with the Law 
Because of the threat of economic espionage, many countries make 
economic security a priority, enacting laws that purport to deter would-
be intelligence gatherers. 100 Although laws in individual countries may 
help protect economic secrets of the country's nationals, such laws do 
not solve the problem of economic espionage internationally. Part of the 
trouble may stem from the history some states have of not respecting the 
intellectual property rights of other states. Historically, patent law in 
some nations encouraged economic espionage abroad. For example, 
one of the earliest patent laws, developed in France, gave "to whomso-
ever shall be the first to bring to France a foreign industry the same 
advantages as if he were inventor of it."101 France has since amended its 
patent law to exclude such encouragement, but the fact that it once ex-
isted only supports the idea that when a nation's economy is threatened, 
ethics will not necessarily keep it from protecting itself in any way 
possible. 
A main legal problem regarding international economic espionage 
is that there currently is no rule that "prevents western multinational 
corporations from committing corrupt practices overseas."102 Although 
progress has been made to prohibit bribes by western multinational cor-
porations in underdeveloped countries via the United States' Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, very few nations have enacted laws that criminal-
ize the bribing of foreign officials. 103 
Another problem is that when such corrupt practices do occur, vic-
timized states fail to adequately retaliate. For example, after United 
99. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, supra note 5. 
100. Salem M. Katsh and Michael P. Dierks, Globally, Trade Secrets are All Over the Map, 
7 No. 11 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 12 (1995). For example, Canada, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States have adopted express statutory protec-
tion for trade secrets. 
101. Bergier, supra note 13, at 13. 
102. Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 
429, 486 (1997). 
103. Id. 
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States officials learned of the existence of French spies in the French 
subsidiaries of Texas Instruments and IBM, the United States govern-
ment simply sent a letter of diplomatic protest to France.104 Similarly, 
the United States took little action against Israeli intelligence officers 
when they stole technological information from a defense contractor in 
Illinois, Recon Optical. 105 Until stronger reprimands are made by vic-
tims against violators and precedent is set to demonstrate that economic 
espionage such as this is intolerable, intelligence agents and others will 
continue to purchase and use stolen information, encouraging economic 
espionage's continuance. 106 
Furthermore, not all countries provide the same protection for in-
tangible property rights, including trade secrets. 107 International intel-
lectual property law does not help because it is quite weak, as will be 
discussed in further detail later in this report. At the present time, it does 
not provide much protection to countries that are regular victims of eco-
nomic espionage.10s 
B. Treaties and International Agreements 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 109 This agreement focuses in part on exploitation of Third 
World natural resources, but its coverage may be construed to reach 
other forms of economic wealth, including technology .110 If the cove-
nant is interpreted in this way, intellectual "innovation and expertise" 
would be considered among a state's natural resources, a subject matter 
which the agreement seeks to protect. 111 Therefore, economic espionage 
might be covered under this provision, but such a notion is questionable 
because the covenant refers more to overt ownership than covert theft of 
resources. 112 
Paris Convention. The Paris Convention for the Protection of In-
dustrial Property, revised in 1967, is a multilateral treaty that provides 
104. Schweizer, supra note 4. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Hoken S. Seki and Peter J. Toren, EEA Violations Could Trigger Criminal Sanctions, 
Stiff Penalties are Intended to Deter Economic Espionage by Foreign Companies in the U.S., 
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at B8. 
108. Perry, supra note 1. 
109. Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
110. Jackamo, supra note 19, at 961. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
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the norms for international patents and trademarks. 113 It is the foremost 
industrial property law treaty and has extensive membership. Parties to 
the convention make up a union that protects industrial property. The 
significance of the union is that it consists of several administrative bod-
ies that were created to ensure that the purposes of the convention would 
be fulfilled: the Assembly (the chief governing body under Article 13 of 
the Convention), the Executive Committee (a smaller body elected from 
the Assembly under Article 14), and the International Bureau of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") (a body that per-
forms the union's administrative tasks pursuant to Article 15).114 The 
Convention sets forth uniform rules by which member states must abide 
with respect to industrial property rights. 
Although the Convention purports to implement important indus-
trial property laws, it is not effective against economic espionage, as 
evidenced by the present amount of economic espionage that takes 
place. Perhaps the reason why the Convention fails to help is because it 
does not specifically address economic espionage. Article 10 on unfair 
competition comes close where it states in subsection two that "any act 
of competition in contrary to honest practices in industrial or commer-
cial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition."115 However, 
member states may hold the view that this does not prohibit economic 
espionage. It should be duly noted that several member states to the 
Convention engage in economic espionage on a regular basis today. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAIT"). On April 15, 
1994, an agreement resulted from the Uruguay Round of GATT, estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and promulgating sev-
eral trade-related agreements. 116 The Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"), a product of the Uru-
guay Round, requires member countries to protect against acquisition, 
disclosure, or use of a party's trade secrets "in a manner contrary to 
honest commercial practices."117 TRIPs specifically refers to "confiden-
tial information" rather than "trade secrets," but still emphasizes that 
such information has commercial value, is not in the public domain, and 
113. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 20-43 (Marshall A. Leaffer, ed., Bureau of 
National Affairs, Inc., 2d ed. 1997). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), reprinted in INTERNA-
TIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 113 at 588-618. 
117. Id. 
17
et al.: Economic Espionage
Published by SURFACE, 1998
144 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 26:127 
is subject to "reasonable steps under the circumstances" to maintain its 
secrecy .118 Relief offered to member states under the agreement in-
cludes injunctions and damages as well as provisional remedies to pre-
vent infringement and to preserve evidence left behind by infringers. 119 
Member states are also required to recognize third party liability .120 
Some countries already comply with TRIPs, but the purpose of the 
agreement is to globally recognize the importance of protecting trade 
secrets. 121 With this in mind, one of TRIPs' main goals is to foster con-
sistency among nations.122 
TRIPs' good intentions are not yet realized. The agreement so far 
has not been successful at curbing economic espionage. Perhaps this is 
due to the fact that TRIPs does not expressly forbid economic espionage. 
Furthermore, "the reality is that all parties knowingly tolerate substantial 
economic espionage activities because all sides believe that, on balance, 
they have more to gain by a world of information or unrestrained efforts 
to prevent 'hostile intelligence activities.' "123 
C. United Nations Resolutions 
Two United Nations Resolutions in particular relate to the problem 
of economic espionage, albeit indirectly. "Peaceful and Neighborly Re-
lations Among States" is the title of Resolution 1236, which was passed 
in 1957.124 It addresses the duty of non-intervention in other states' in-
ternal affairs, and calls upon states to settle their disputes in a peaceful 
manner. 
A second resolution (Resolution 2131 ), passed in 1965 and entitled 
the "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sover-
eignty" (the "Declaration on Inadmissibility"), declares that "[n]o state 
has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, 
in the internal or external affairs of any other State."125 The declaration 
condemns armed intervention as well as "all other forms of interference 
or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its 
118. Katsh and Dierks, supra note 100, at 15. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. (emphasis added). 
122. Id. 
123. Relevant Intelligence in the Post-Cold War World (visited Sept. 10, 1998) <http:// 
www.venable.com/govern/fulltext.htm>. 
124. G.A. Res. 1236, 12 U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 5, U.N. Doc. Af3805 
(1957). 
125. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. Af6014 (1965). 
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political, economic, and cultural elements .... "126 Arguably, however, 
this resolution was intended to deal more with economic sanctions than 
theft of private commercial secrets. 
Because a state's economy is part of its internal affairs and eco-
nomic espionage is an activity by which one state intervenes in another 
state's economic affairs, it could be construed that both resolutions indi-
rectly condemn economic espionage. Each promotes non-intervention, 
and Resolution 2131 specifically condemns interference in a state's eco-
nomic elements. However, these resolutions are ineffective in the war 
against economic espionage for the following reasons. 
First, these and other United Nations resolutions on non-interven-
tion lack the specificity to serve as guidelines that pinpoint permissible 
intervention. 127 Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between what 
may and what may not be acceptable intelligence practices. Second, in 
reference to Resolution 2131, many states felt that the General Assem-
bly merely expressed a political, rather than legal, view .128 Third, states 
continually question the authority of General Assembly resolutions. Be-
cause these resolutions are persuasive and not binding materials, some 
states tend to ignore them. 129 The end result is that in spite of United 
Nations resolutions that are seemingly against it, economic espionage 
continues to exist. 
D. An International Organization 
World Intellectual Property Organization ( "WIPO "). WIPO is the 
most important global intellectual property organization. Established by 
a convention at Stockholm in 1967, it administers international unions 
related to intellectual property, including the Paris Convention. Its main 
role is protecting the interests of intellectual property on a world-wide 
level.130 In 1995, WIPO concluded an agreement with the World Trade 
Organization, establishing a cooperative relationship in which WIPO 
will provide WTO members and their nationals with copies of relevant 
laws and regulations in the same way that WIPO supplies its own mem-
bers with such documents. 131 
126. Id. (emphasis added). 
127. Jackamo, supra note 19, at 964. 
128. Id. at 963. 
129. Id. at 970. 
130. lNTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 561 (Marshall A. Leaffer ed., 
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 2d ed. 1997). 
131. Id. at 577. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
"Any discussion about 'economic intelligence' must begin with an 
awareness that it is indeed a Brave New World for the Intelligence Com-
munity, one that must be entered with extraordinary sensitivity, as well 
as extensive public dialogue."132 The sensitivity requirement exists be-
cause economic espionage is a sensitive subject area for many busi-
nesses. As was pointed out earlier in this report, businesses are reluctant 
to admit that they are victims of economic espionage. Additionally, this 
is a sensitive area because businesses instinctively try to keep their trade 
secrets from others, in order to prevent hard economic data from falling 
into the hands of both competitors and government representatives. 133 
The public dialogue requirement exists because states must communi-
cate nationally and internationally if they are to reach any agreements to 
help stop economic espionage. 
What the preceding discussion of economic espionage shows is that 
there is a tremendous need for countries to create a global economic 
espionage agreement. Individual corporations and countries attempt to 
handle matters on their own, but it is difficult for them to counteract 
economic espionage, especially when foreign corporations and countries 
sanction and support such activity .134 The fact that economic espionage 
continues to exist demonstrates that there is a need to set international 
business rules-both to promote fair economic competition and to bal-
ance competing values in a proper and formal way. 135 
There is presently much debate, both within nations and interna-
tionally, about the ways in which economic espionage should be con-
trolled. The debate revolves around unilateral and multilateral action. 136 
Industrialized countries are the leaders in implementing this action. 
They are now attempting to reach an agreement that would prohibit 
bribes and other corrupt practices in doing business abroad. 137 Corrupt 
business practices are illegal in all the industrialized countries. 138 
Hence, the proposed agreement will simply extend that prohibition to 
activities abroad, potentially leading to higher ethical standards in devel-
oping countries where corruption runs rampant. 139 
132. Relevant Intelligence in the Post-Cold War World, supra note 123. 
133. Id. 
134. FrALKA, supra note 36, at 7. 
135. Seita, supra note 102, at 484. 
136. Moyer, supra note 30, at 179. 
137. Seita, supra note 102, at 486-87. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
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Scholars and economists alike suggest many ways to battle eco-
nomic espionage. The following is a compilation of popular sugges-
tions. First, states must come to terms with what specifically constitutes 
the key elements of unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory con-
duct with respect to economic espionage, thereby defining the problem 
in explicit detail. 140 States must recognize what is and what is not eco-
nomic espionage if they are to combat it. 
Second, states must incorporate existing law, both national and in-
ternational, that may apply to economic espionage, and propose new law 
where existing law fails to control economic espionage. 141 
Third, on the "supply side" of the economic espionage problem, 
states must make efforts to control their own exports and heighten indi-
vidual corporate security .142 
Fourth, on the "government side" of the economic espionage prob-
lem, states need to take advantage of existing governments and intelli-
gence agencies of individual nations to curb economic espionage 
through law enforcement mechanisms. 143 
Fifth, states need to specify the roles that individual nations will 
play in identifying and countering the threats that economic espionage 
imposes on the industry of all nations, paying special attention to the 
manner in which such functions and roles are coordinated. 144 
Sixth, states must identify what constitutes the industrial threat, by 
discussing the threat to nations' industry of economic espionage and any 
trends in that threat, including: the number and identity of the govern-
ments conducting economic espionage; the industrial sectors and types 
of information and technology targeted by such espionage; and the 
methods used to conduct such espionage. 145 
Seventh, states need to work together toward an international crimi-
nal law solution, discussing the possibility of creating a coherent, mod-
em body of international criminal law that deters and/or penalizes 
economic espionage.146 
Finally, states might consider alternatives to banning economic es-
pionage altogether. This might include the possibility of creating a 
140. Moyer, supra note 30, at 179. 
141. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 
supra note 28. 
142. Moyer, supra note 30, at 179. 
143. Id. 
144. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 
supra note 28. 
145. Id. 
146. FIALKA, supra note 36, at 206. 
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United Nations or international economic intelligence service that works 
equally for all nations, leveling the field in which economic espionage is 
played. Perhaps an international economic intelligence agency could in-
spect and conduct surveillance globally, and share its findings with all 
nations. This might eliminate the current threats to global economic 
harmony. 147 
Overall, the importance of states working together to combat eco-
nomic espionage cannot be stressed enough. This already occurs be-
tween some states, and others must follow such a lead. For example, 
some FBI agents in the United States regularly make contact with Scot-
land Yard or with the French police and work collectively in attempting 
to stop international criminals who are being investigated by both coun-
tries.148 This kind of activity may open doors for creating relationships 
at a higher level, such as mutual legal assistance treaties for dealing with 
economic espionage crimes. 149 The United States Department of Justice 
already has such treaties, which provide procedures to share evidence 
and facilitate cooperative law enforcement with many countries through-
out the world. 150 However, it does not presently have such treaties with 
any of the countries of Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union, 
which began increasing their economic espionage activity with the end 
of the Cold War.151 
V. CONCLUSION 
Economic espionage will continue to be on the rise, unless nations 
make joint efforts to start dealing with the problem. Because of the dra-
matic changes to the world's military and economic divisions caused by 
the end of the Cold War, the probability that nations will continue to 
commit economic espionage against one another is great. Illicit gather-
ing of competitor nations' economic information is what allows many 
nations to compete effectively in the world market. Those who take part 
in economic espionage will not be readily willing to stop, especially if it 
means losing any clout they have as members of the global economy. 
World leaders recognize that economic power is fundamental to national 
power. If nations persist to place their domestic priorities above interna-
tional norms, the international economy will suffer as a result. For the 
world to achieve an even somewhat stable economy, individual govern-
147. BERGIER, supra note 13, at 175. 
148. Howard M. Shapiro, The FBI in the 2Ist Century, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 219, 224 
(1995). 
149. Id. at 227. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
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ments must be willing to put aside their short-term parochial interests 
and begin harmonizing business practices with one another. 152 It is vital 
that global leaders form an agreement on economic espionage. The 
world's economic future depends on it. 
Karen Sepura 
152. GILPIN, supra note 41, at 406. 
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APPENDIX 
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACROSS COUNTRIES: 
LEVELS OF So PHIS TICA TION 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
China Colombia Iraq 
France India Libya 
Germany Russia 
Israel South Korea 
Japan Ukraine 
United States 
Tier 1: Through their technological and intelligence abilities, these 
countries eavesdrop electronically and perform computer intelligence 
gathering. 
Tier 2: Although these countries have high-level intelligence gath-
ering organizations, they do not have resources for computer and data 
intelligence gathering. 
Tier 3: These countries' intelligence agencies will have high tech-
nology capabilities in the near future. 
Source: Edwin Fraumann, Economic Espionage: Security Missions 
Redefined, 51 Pua. ADMIN. REv. 303 (1997), at 303. 
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